Above photo: The Cradle / Radwan Mortada.
Interview with Iraq’s ex-PM Adil Abdul-Mahdi.
In an exclusive interview, he reveals the challenges, foreign conspiracies, and controversies that defined his truncated two-year tenure, amidst political and economic turmoil that shook the nation.
Adil Abdul-Mahdi, prime minister of Iraq from October 2018 to May 2020, emerged as a significant figure during one of the most tumultuous periods in the country’s recent history.
Caught between navigating relations with Washington and Tehran, and a worsening economic crisis, he ultimately resigned in the face of popular protests and the state’s violent crackdown.
In a rare media interview with The Cradle, Abdul-Mahdi candidly discloses details of those harrowing days and the foreign interests – particularly American and British – that played a hand in the chaos, terrorism, sectarianism, and economic dependencies that continue to beset Iraq today.
Abdul-Mahdi reveals the attempts of US President Donald Trump’s administration to create a new reality in Iraq, unlike its predecessors, to further destabilize Iraq by turning it into a base against Iran and tightening the sanctions noose on Baghdad.
The western anti-ISIS coalition, he says, only aimed to strike a balance between the terror group and those fighting against them under the guise of ‘counter terrorism’ – so that there would be no clear winner.
His downfall was not so much the 2019 October Revolution that led to his resignation, but his refusal to take hostile stances against Iran and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) that defeated ISIS. The US did not like these positions, and Abdul-Mahdi enumerates a series of situations in which he came head to head with Washington, and reveals the role of Qassem Soleimani in Iraq’s victory against terrorism.
Abdul-Mahdi, an economist by profession, also discusses the future of Iraq and the new Levant, and the expected consequences of the Iranian-Saudi reconciliation in Iraq.
The Cradle: How do you see the future of Iraq? Is there a need to review the constitution and abolish sectarianism? Isn’t it time to build a modern civil state?
Adil Abdul-Mahdi: I am against imagining a model in our minds and trying to drag reality into it. We certainly have ambitions, but we must match them with reality. In this part of the world, there are words we don’t like, such as cantons, federation, confederation, and so on.
The Swiss system, for example, is a confederation based on cantons, and this country has witnessed conflicts similar to what we have experienced. The US also witnessed conflicts between blacks and whites and civil wars before it settled on a federal system.
I do not claim that these countries radically solved all their problems, but they entered a path of synthesis between their components, which made them able to coexist with each other, as each component obtains its rights. The solution is not in theories that we read in books but rather in experiences that we see before us all over the world.
The Cradle: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is looking to implement his vision for a ‘New East,’ which includes Iraq. Do you support going in this direction?
Abdul-Mahdi: We have been in favor of going in this direction for a long time. My visit to China in September 2019 was within this context. When I was Minister of Oil in 2015, in the government of PM Haider al-Abadi, we laid the foundations for what is today called the credit framework agreement between Iraq and China as part of our plan for the reconstruction of Iraq.
Heading east is not a theoretical option. Rather, it has become a global option, in parallel with western weakness and the growing Asian counterbalance. Previously, 70 percent of Iraqi oil was exported to western countries.
Today, China alone imports between 700 thousand and one million barrels per day. We are witnessing an Asian rise, and today there are large countries on the continent that compete with the US militarily, economically, technologically, scientifically, morally, and socially, and are even ahead of them at times.
Heading east has become a natural path, not a political decision. We are facing a major historical transformation, not political choices that may succeed or fail. This path has momentum and tools that will enable it to impose itself globally.
The Cradle: Where did this all start? What is your assessment of Paul Bremer’s leadership as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, where he was effectively Iraq’s de facto head of state? To what extent is Iraq still grappling with the consequences of his actions during that period?
Abdul-Mahdi: Bremer represents the pinnacle of American arrogance. When White House Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad organized the first meeting of Iraqi leaders after the ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime, he assured the delegates that the US has absolutely no interest in ruling Iraq, and an agreement was reached with the Iraqi opposition parties to form a transitional government.
Bremer halted this process. During his first meeting with Iraqi leaders to present Washington’s expectations of the civil administration he would lead, he addressed everyone, saying:
“We only need you as advisors. We will build the state, and your role is to help us.”
All those present, Massed Barzani, Jalal Talabani, Ahmad Chalabi, Ayad Allawi, and us, considered this as an unacceptable foreign occupation. However, Bremer imposed his opinion by force and began issuing legislation and laws called Bremer’s decisions – all in all, 111 pieces of Iraqi legislation that still affect the Central Bank, ministries, and others.
Bremer was very arrogant and believed that he was able to subjugate the country, and he wanted to impose a system of elite elections as in the US, and not general elections for all the Iraqi people. However, Ayatollah Ali Sistani refused and insisted that writing the constitution be left to Iraqis voted in through an elected national assembly.
The Cradle: What led to the outbreak of sectarian conflicts in Iraq, and was the US involved in them?
Abdul-Mahdi: Of course the Americans were involved. The US prefers to weaken everyone in order to control them. Speaking of sectarian war, we must go back to those who sparked sectarian strife in the beginning.
Al-Qaeda started the slaughter in Afghanistan before Iraq. The first major assassination targeted Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim in 2003, and this has significant meaning. The Iraqi sectarian war did not break out because the Shia gained more political clout in the state, but rather because there was a group that rejected this new reality and was materially and directly supported by foreign powers – American, British, and others.
They began to establish armed groups in the western regions, while the Americans were preventing the formation of popular committees in other regions under the pretext that they would turn into militias.
The Cradle: Do you have information about an American role in supporting Al-Qaeda in Iraq?
Abdul-Mahdi: I will not give a simple answer. Before 2011, the international coalition, including the Americans, fought against terrorism. But eradicating this terrorism completely was not on their agenda.
This is happening today in Syria, for example, where we see sometimes the Americans targeting leaders in Al-Qaeda and ISIS, but without any effort to eliminate these organizations completely, and thus they establish a kind of balance between the terrorists and their enemies. This is evident in Syria and elsewhere.
The Cradle: What was the role of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in liberating Iraq from ISIS and eliminating terrorism?
Abdul-Mahdi: The PMU played a very important role. In 2003 we proposed the establishment of popular committees because we did not have time to build an army and police forces. After Bremer dissolved the Iraqi army, it was reconstituted from the same soldiers and officers.
The political parties that have military arms expressed enthusiasm for the proposal, while the unarmed parties opposed it, fearing that this would give others an advantage over them. The Americans were also afraid of the popular committees, so the proposal was rejected.
When ISIS occupied Mosul with a few hundred fighters, there were five military divisions, and there was no shortage of weapons or equipment. Rather, we were facing a problem with the army’s fighting doctrine and a lack of willingness to sacrifice.
The Cradle: Isn’t corruption the reason for the fall of Mosul in the hands of ISIS?
Abdul-Mahdi: There are many reasons: corruption, lack of fighting doctrine, the desire of some to cooperate with ISIS, and so on. When the American forces entered Fallujah in 2004, it was agreed that an army brigade would be deployed in the city.
It later became clear that the entire brigade was Baathist. The feeling that there is no military institution protecting the country, coupled with the growth of ISIS to the point of threatening Baghdad and spreading fear among the people, led to the fatwa of the Supreme Religious Authority and general mobilization.
The security of Iraq today is maintained by the PMU and the forces – whether tribal or non-tribal – that have no interest in harmonizing with terrorism, and are firmer and stronger in fighting it. The idea of the Popular Mobilization today is present in all parts of Iraq.
Kurdistan, for example, remained safe because it has Peshmerga forces, and those areas did not witness what the rest of Iraq witnessed, even though Kurdistan was targeted by al-Qaeda.
The Cradle: What was the role of Major General Qassem Soleimani in confronting terrorism in Iraq?
Abdul-Mahdi: It was a very big role. Martyr Soleimani possessed many qualities. He was a first-rate strategist. He was immediately able to develop a comprehensive strategic picture of the theater of operations, strengths, and weaknesses of each side.
He was also able to weave friendships with everyone, including the Kurds, the Shias, and the Sunnis. He also distinguished between popular resistance and the paths followed by the state, and that each had different working methods and tools.
In addition, he was the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a large country with tremendous capabilities, so he was able to provide the needs of the battle without going through routine routes.
In a few hours, he was able to establish an air bridge to supply Iraq with weapons, which with other parties would have taken months. In the field, he was the first decision-maker, and he was always at the head of the fighters, what inspired the battle leaders and their fighters, and also gave the army and police units morale. If they had it, Mosul would not have fallen in the first place.
The Cradle: Why did Americans assassinate Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis?
Abdul-Mahdi: I see this decision as an expression of despair, weakness, and impotence, and an escape from America’s crisis in Iraq. It was a foolish decision, because the assassination of a great leader like martyr Soleimani is certainly a great loss, but at the same time, it increases determination. It was a crime even under US laws, and certainly under international law.
The US often makes legitimate demands to serve suspicious agendas. Today it is clear that the so-called smart or color revolutions mainly use financial support and propaganda to brainwash and direct the masses to certain paths to serve goals other than the one for which they came out.
The October events in Iraq were an expression of an American and Israeli desire to weaken Iraq when it began to emerge – even partially – from the circle of American dictates, and at a time when the resistance forces that the US considers terrorists were getting stronger, so the decision was to weaken them by provoking chaos and fighting between the Shia and also between Iraqis.
The Cradle: Do you mean it was planned? Who was behind it, and what was it aiming for?
Abdul-Mahdi: Of course it was planned. There are similar justified claims by many countries. When these countries are close to the American-Israeli camp, the international community comes to their aid, but if they are not, these demands are often exploited to turn people against governments, as happened in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and other places.
Even China, whose development was admired, the Americans suddenly decided to demonize when it became a competitor to the US, and Trump threatened to launch a trade war against it.
After 2003, Iraq was keen on balancing its relations between the US and its Iranian neighbor. With Trump’s arrival in the White House, the Americans wanted Baghdad to stop this policy. They were frank in saying: “You are either with us or against us.”
Iraq cannot stand against Iran, despite the existence of some differences. We may disagree with Iran over the distribution of water, or an oil well here, or another issue there, but this does not mean that we should go to war with it.
The American administration, even under Republican George Bush, understood Iraq’s relations with the Islamic Republic, and Iraq sometimes conveyed messages between the two parties. With the advent of Trump, things changed. This Iraqi stance of moderation is no longer acceptable to the US.
The Cradle: What are the interests of both Tehran and Washington in Iraq?
Abdul-Mahdi: Relations with Iran are historical, and there are ties between the two countries at all levels. Millions of Iraqis lived in Iran, and millions of Iranians lived in Iraq. I am not talking about the Shia ties.
The same applies to the relationship between the Kurds of Iran and the Kurds of Iraq, and the relationship between the Sunni Sufi sects in the two countries. So, they are historical relations, despite the differences that sometimes mar them, as happens between any two neighboring countries.
During the Iraq-Iran war, the Islamic Republic was subjected to a massive demonization campaign, until the US occupation of Iraq took place. Some believed that prosperity and development would come from our relations with the most powerful country in the world.
Iran is a historical neighbor, as are Turkiye and the Arab countries. Commonalities must be strengthened and differences resolved based on this historical relationship.
The Cradle: Has your government been under pressure from Washington and Tehran?
Abdul-Mahdi: Of course, there was pressure from Washington. Since Trump’s visit to Ain al-Assad base, and because of our support to the PMU, and our refusal to enter into conflicts with Shia and non-Shia factions, American pressure has been increasing.
I told US official David Schenker: “Our relations with Iran go back 5,000 years, and Iran is a neighboring country. At the same time, we want the Americans who are 5,000 kilometers away from us to be our friends. However, we cannot give up 5,000 years of relationships.”
Every day, millions of Iranians enter Iraq, and the same number from Iraq enter Iran, while we need a visa to travel to the US. America came to the region for its interests, and Iran is part of the region and defends its interests, like all countries in the region.
We cannot compare our relations with neighboring countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, or Iran, with our relations with distant countries. This is an existential relationship that goes back centuries and has many common interests.
It cannot be compared to the relationship with a country that came from far away to defend Israel and to dominate oil and so on. I cannot equate two things that are not equal. We must define our relations with each party according to its characteristics, history, weight, and what it wants, so that we can find a point of balance in relations with all parties.
The Cradle: How did Washington confront the Iranian presence in Iraq and succeed in inciting the Iraqis against the PMU and Iran, leading to the October events?
Abdul-Mahdi: Before their occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Americans were keen to neutralize Iran and ensure that it does not interfere in favor of Saddam Hussein’s regime. They also needed the support of the Shia factions, most of which resided in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The two countries supported the political process in what looked like sharing roles, and this continued even in the war against ISIS. The American acknowledged the role of the PMU, the Shia armed forces, and the Iranians on the ground, while these parties, in turn, acknowledged the US role in air coverage within the coalition forces in specific areas.
We can call this a mutual recognition of the red lines of each party, or a kind of harmony. This continued until Trump reached the White House. After that, the American goal became to strike Iran, which Trump has stated publicly many times.
The events of October came in this context to weaken the Iraqi government, which refused to be hostile to Iran and to sacrifice the PMU. This was not accepted by the Americans.
The Cradle: Aside from the poor political and living conditions, what was the main reason for the outbreak of the October 2019 unrest?
Abdul-Mahdi: In fact, the poor political and living conditions in Iraq were not a major reason. Before 2017, terrorism, assassinations, suicide bombers, and booby-traps were the main concern of the people. With the stabilization of conditions after 2017, people cared more about improving their living conditions.
Indeed, these conditions were improving, but they wanted more, and this is their right. They wanted better government services and higher wages. Also, the freedom of expression allowed for peaceful demonstrations.
In 2018, a fundamental change took place with the arrival of Republican Trump to the White House. Previously, there was a kind of appeasement between the US and Iran, and there was mutual recognition by both countries of each other’s interests, and our relations with both countries were balanced.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told us bluntly: “You must stand against Iran.” We vehemently rejected that, and even in the government’s ministerial statement, we confirmed that we are not part of the sanctions regime against Iran.
This, of course, annoyed the US administration. A series of events took place: Trump’s visit to Ain al-Assad base without us receiving him, the protection we provided for the PMU, the American and Israeli bombing of the headquarters of the PMU and the factions.
The situation started to escalate. Here, the spontaneous peaceful demonstrations were exploited to mobilize against the PMU and the Islamic Republic, and the slogan “Iran out” began to be raised.
Of course, there are internal parties that played a role in these events, including the remnants of the Baath Party, the remnants of ISIS, and other political forces that aspired to reach the highest positions. All this led to the events of October 2019.
The Cradle: Aren’t there other factors, such as your decision to open the Iraqi-Syrian border, opening up to China, and dismissing (pro-US) Lieutenant General Abdel Wahhab al-Saadi from the post of head of the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS)?
Abdul-Mahdi: These factors may be influencing. But the main factor is our relationship with the Islamic Republic and the PMU, and the growth of this axis after the defeat of ISIS. Certainly, the opening of the Al-Qaim land crossing with Syria annoyed the Americans and the Israelis.
The crossing was bombed, and we lost about 30 martyrs. The US embassy in Baghdad was besieged, and an attempt was made to storm it during their funeral. All this contributed to the American and Israeli escalation against our government.
The openness to China was an indication of Iraq’s quest to get out of American and western hegemony and to submit to Israeli conditions. The occupation of Iraq had a major strategic goal to subdue it and keep it in the US axis. This great goal failed, which greatly displeased them. This surely annoyed them.
Regarding the dismissal of Lieutenant General Abdel Wahhab Al-Saadi, there is an exaggeration in the matter. He was not in first place in the CTS. Its chief, Lieutenant General Talib Shagathi, asked for his transfer, and in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, I did so.
My relationship with Saadi is good. During the liberation of the Baiji refinery from ISIS, he was among the leaders who led military operations in that area, and I gave him my pistol. There was no problem between me and him. My agreement to remove him may have been exploited – but I did it at the behest of his boss, and we intended to appoint him to a more important position.
The Cradle: Did the Americans try to impose political conditions on you before October 2019, and did you reject them?
Abdul-Mahdi: I stated that clearly. They demanded that we attack the armed factions, prevent transfers of funds to the Islamic Republic, and reject the arrival of the martyr Lieutenant General Qassem Soleimani to Iraq.
We used to discuss this with the US ambassador several times a week, as well as with senior US officials and military personnel, and NATO leaders. We were keen on friendship with America and the west, but we were practicing what we believed to be an independent and balanced sovereign policy in Iraq.
After Trump’s term ended, things returned to the old contexts. When any Iranian official visited us, the Americans used to turn things upside down, exerting pressure not only on the prime minister, but on a large number of Iraqi officials, in the ministries of the interior, defense, oil, the central bank, intelligence, and the Commercial Bank of Iraq.
The pressure in these locations was more severe and was presented as if it was a service to Iraq. In fact, it was the consolidation of dependence on the US.
The Cradle: What are the expected repercussions of the Iranian-Saudi reconciliation on Iraq?
Abdul-Mahdi: The expected repercussions are many. Between Iraq and both Saudi Arabia and Iran, there is a long history of relations and economic interests, and there are social segments that have extensions within each of these countries.
Any truce will have great positive repercussions. In addition, Saudi Arabia and Iran have great interests in many neighboring countries, and interests between each other. Today, with the diminished clout of foreign countries, especially the US and Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia have no choice but to coexist, reconcile, build bridges and cooperate.
There is no doubt that there will be setbacks and frustrations because of a history of hostility, but I believe that the general course of the regional and international developments is pushing towards reconciliation and rapprochement more and more, despite the persistence of some doubts on each side.