From Guantanamo To Abu Ghraib: Female Participation In Prisoner Abuses

Above photo: Lynndie England with a naked detainee at Abu Ghraib. AP.

Originally presented at The Women’s Research and Education Institute’s Women in the Military Conference, Washington, D.C., May 19-20, 20005. (Updated July 30, 2005)

As a retired U.S. Army Reserve Colonel with 13 years on active duty and 16 in the Reserves, I became interested in the topic of women involved in prisoner abuses when so many U.S. women at all levels were linked to the prisons or prisoners in Afghanistan, Guantanamo, Cuba, and Iraq.  In reading press articles about detentions, incarcerations, and the abuse and torture of prisoners identified as threats to national security, I was struck by the number of women who had some role in the detentions — women in the U.S. military, civilian women in various U.S. government agencies and civilian women contractors.

Women have been working in the intelligence field from making policy to conducting interrogations; managing Iraqi prison operations and guarding prisoners; serving as military and civilian lawyers and dealing with the issues of torture and abuse; medically treating abused and tortured prisoners; and autopsying bodies of detainees who died while imprisoned.  .

Having served in many crisis situations around the world as an Army officer and six years as a U.S. diplomat, I was amazed by the sheer number of women now involved in the legal, medical, and intelligence aspects of prisoner incarceration.

No Accountability for Illegal Prisoner Abuse and Torture Severely Damages the U.S.’s Reputation and the U.S. Military as an Institution

When the Bush administration decided to exclude combatants in Afghanistan from the protections of the Geneva Convention, I was shocked. I have taught “Law of Land Warfare” at the Special Warfare Center in Fort Bragg, NC, which is part of the U.S Army’s John F. Kennedy School of International Studies, and I had hoped that U.S. adherence to the Geneva conventions might protect U.S. troops should an enemy capture them.  If the U.S. did not abide by the Geneva Convention, why should we expect others to do so?  In military circles worldwide, news of abusive treatment of military forces becomes known quickly, and surely I believed, the chickens would come home to roost within the international community.  The Bush administration’s decision to characterize al Qaeda and the Taliban as “enemy combatants” and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s gleeful description of virtually any person detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan as dangerous, evil, and tied to terrorism seemed arrogant and naïve and posed a danger for our own military forces.

Abuse and torture of prisoners by U.S. military, CIA and civilian contractors became routine in Afghanistan, Guantanamo and Iraq because senior civilian leaders in the Department of Defense (DOD) perceived that the prisoners had to be “broken” to get intelligence.  One would suspect, and the rest of the world would confirm, that abuse and torture continue in those three locations as well as in the secret and CIA-operated detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, on the U.S. military-occupied island of Diego Garcia and on U.S. Navy ships.  DOD leaders did (and do) not care that evidence gathered by military and civilian intelligence personnel in Central America, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States overwhelmingly demonstrates that torture and abuse are not effective in extracting accurate information from detainees.  Indeed, there is no evidence that the mistreatment and humiliation of a prisoner has saved a life of an American soldier or prevented a terrorist event.

Predictably, the abuse and torture of prisoners have created an environment where an ever-increasing number of relatives and friends of those abused have taken revenge on the perpetrators of the abuses—U.S military forces and Iraqis who work with Americans.  Recent research on conflicts worldwide has shown that suicide bombers in general are only in countries where there is an occupation force or, as in the recent case of the London bombings, in a country that is engaged in the occupation of another nation.  As long as the coalition forces are in Iraq, the suicide bombings will continue.

As a military retiree with many friends currently serving in the U.S. military, I know that the instances of prisoner abuse and torture have severely damaged the credibility and honor of the U.S. military not only with the American public but also with those inside the institution.  Additionally, I have heard from my many friends in the U.S. diplomatic corps that the reputations of the U.S. military and government are at an all-time low due to the Iraqi war and prisoner abuses.   International law has declared that torture is illegal; humanity decries its use. The world’s citizenry, outside the U.S., finds the lack of accountability for documented abuses and torture, excepting low-ranking Reserve soldiers, startling and unbelievable.  The continuing abuses in Iraq, including the 11 soldiers charged with assaulting detainees in July, 2005 and the removal of their entire unit from combat duty (reported by AP on July 16, 2005), leads potential suicide bombers to conclude, that despite their protestations to the contrary, President Bush and his senior Department of Defense civilian staff still condone and turn a blind-eye to a policy of abuse and torture.  Undoubtedly, America and its allies will continue to pay a severe price for these illegal and criminal actions.

Why are You Singling Out Women?

Many people with whom I have discussed the topic of Women Involved in Prisoner Abuse have had very strong feelings.  They have argued:

Why are you singling out women, when male military personnel have been involved too?

Aren’t you giving ammunition to those who want to curtail women’s opportunities in the U.S. military?

Why aren’t you talking about the U.S. military women who have done their jobs well while serving in Afghanistan, Iraq and Cuba and are not involved in prisoner abuse?

If you are going to talk about the junior-enlisted personnel who have been punished for the abuses, you had better discuss the role of supervisors and superiors.

The Curious Retired Military Officer

Cynthia Enloe, Research Professor of International Development and Women’s Studies at Clark University, has written a book entitled “The Curious Feminist.”  In this collection of essays, Enloe identifies a feminist curiosity that translates into taking women seriously for what they can reveal about globalization and international politics.   From 2001 to 2004, I became the “Curious Retired Military Officer” as I read and began to notice emerging patterns dealing with prisoner abuse.

My Curious Questions:

• How does one’s position of authority over prisoners affect one’s judgment on what is the right or wrong treatment of other humans, even during war?  Does gender affect one’s judgment?
• Is there a policy of dehumanizing the enemy so that authorities have less concern or guilt in using painful or humiliating techniques to elicit information?
• Were soldiers properly trained in their duties?  Did they know the legal ramifications of their actions?  Did they experience an ethical and moral dilemma when they committed the abuses?
• Did the decision to add a new category of detainee, enemy combatant, and President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s declarations that the protections of the Geneva Convention did not apply to these detainees, confuse the military and civilian legal, intelligence and police communities about the techniques they could use to elicit information?
• Even if the Geneva conventions did not apply, was the willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment of other humans a crime for which soldiers could be prosecuted?
• Was there a Command responsibility in the prisoner abuses?
• • Was there a superior-subordinate relationship?
  •  Did the superior know or have reason to know that a subordinate had committed a crime?
  • Did the superior fail to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crime or to punish the perpetrator?
• Statistically, because many women are in military police and military intelligence units, was it almost inevitable that women would be involved in prisoner abuses?
• Why did the American public see only 29 photos of the Abu Ghraib prison abuses?
• Who appears in the remaining 1200 plus photos and videos that were shown to the U.S. Congress?
• Why were photos of only Reserve personnel shown to the public?
• Were women Reserve personnel in a disproportionate number of those photos? If so, why?
• Where were the active duty personnel stationed in the prison?
• Where were the photos of the active duty military intelligence personnel who were conducting the actual interrogation of detainees?
• How is it possible that after three major investigations of military police and military intelligence activities in Abu Ghraib prison, we know the names of only the four Army Reserve males, three Army Reserve females (all from one U.S. Army Reserve Unit) and one Army Reserve intelligence enlisted male who were court-martialed?
• Why have no active duty personnel been identified as having poorly supervised interrogation techniques and activities?
• Is there a pattern of prisoner abuse beginning in Afghanistan, continuing to Guantanamo and culminating in Abu Ghraib, Iraq?
• Finally, is it right to question decisions made by our civilian and military leaders during a war?

Historical Perspective:

Grenada 

To put my interest in prisons and prisoner abuse into historical perspective, in 1983 as an active-duty U.S. Army Major, I worked in Grenada as a member of the international law team of the 18^th Airborne Corps after the U.S. military’s so-called intervention, invasion or rescue mission.  I was on the claims commission that provided compensation for personal injuries and deaths of Grenadian citizens and for damages to personal property. I also dealt with the international law aspects of the prisoner-of-war camp the U.S. military had set up for Cuban construction workers in Grenada and monitored how military police and military intelligence conducted their missions at the camp.  We, the lawyers, had to stop interrogators who had decided to soften up prisoners by placing them inside small wooden boxes covered with black plastic under the hot Caribbean sun.  On the positive side, we worked with Grenadian officials to assist Cuban prisoners in marrying their Grenadian girlfriends and then transporting the couples back to Cuba.  We also put a two-day hold on one Cuban prisoner’s return to Cuba so that he could see his one-day-old son before he was sent back.

Somalia

Ten years later, in 1993, as a U.S. diplomat heading the Justice Division for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), I was responsible for reestablishing the police, judicial, and prison systems in Somalia. Monitoring Somalis detained by U.S. and UN forces was important in creating credibility with the Somali people, an attempt that was overwhelmed by the fighting between UN/U.S. forces and followers of various Somali warlords.

Afghanistan

In 2001, as a U.S. diplomat, I was on the small team that reopened the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.  I was also a liaison with the U.S. military and CIA paramilitary operators in Afghanistan from December, 2001 until April, 2002.  We knew that the U.S. military had set up various detention facilities throughout the country and the military assured us that prisoners were being treated appropriately.  However, obtaining access to these facilities was difficult.  I had much more access when on active duty with the military than as a diplomat.  We were at the mercy of the military and CIA for transportation to the facility and for determining whom we could see.

During the time I was in Afghanistan, only the Presidential Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad was granted access to a prison facility operated by the U.S. military.  Khalilzad, the National Security Council director for the Middle East and Afghanistan, was later the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and is now the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq.

When Things Go Wrong

I, like most people who have been in the military, the police, or the legal system, know that sometimes in combat or other crisis situations, people react in ways that are inexplicable considering their professional training and their general “family” upbringing. Situations in war sometimes require split-second judgments that are rooted in habits ingrained by endless training; other situations afford time for better analysis and judgment.

In the military, obedience to a superior’s commands is one of the foundations of order and discipline.  This obedience is grounded in a faith that the superior knows the rules and how to keep you out of trouble—and more importantly, how to keep you alive.

However, even in the military, an individual always has a choice in how one acts or responds.  If that choice runs counter to the orders given, disobedience involves great risk and an official or non-official punishment generally follows.  Some service people have said they were “following orders” in abusing prisoners.  Those complicit in this treatment knew it was morally wrong, but did it anyway as they felt they had to follow their superior’s orders.  Others refused to abuse prisoners, reported the abuses to persons higher in the chain of command, and provided photos of the abused to military criminal investigators.  Either many supervisors failed to supervise those under their commands and to hold them accountable for the abuses, or the supervisors condoned the treatment. Despite the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) reports of alleged prisoner abuse beginning in early 2002 in Afghanistan, very brave  junior enlisted soldiers needed to step forward with photos of the abuses before any investigations began in Abu Ghraib.

Unquestionably, almost every military conflict results in injuries or death to innocent civilians and to those military and paramilitary forces involved in fighting.  Regardless of international law and convention, when opponents capture and hold military personnel or civilians, the prisoners are all too often subjected to illegal techniques to elicit information.  While the Geneva Convention prohibits certain interrogatory techniques, virtually all military forces and civilian intelligence agencies continue to use those techniques.  Generally, few are held accountable for their abusive actions and those few have been the losers in a war.

After World War II, German and Japanese military officers were tried for war crimes against civilians and captured military, but no allied personnel were held accountable for the hundreds of thousands of civilians who died from the firebombing of German and Japanese cities and the use of the atomic bomb. Instead the victors classified these actions as military necessities for ending the war and preventing further allied casualties.  Victors have never held themselves accountable to the same measure they hold their enemy.

In recent U.S. military history, a few soldiers, but seldom leaders, are held accountable for their actions.  In 1971, U.S. soldiers were prosecuted (and one, Lt. Calley convicted) for the murder of Vietnamese women, children and older men in the My Lai Massacre.  Many Vietnam veterans argue that U.S. personnel abused hundreds of their Vietnamese military opponents and civilians and no one was held accountable.  In Grenada, the U.S. Army court-martialed soldiers for looting and for taking weapons for personal use, but there were no allegations of civilian abuse and no charges against the “hot box” interrogators because we lawyers stopped the technique when it began.  In Somalia, the Canadian military court-martialed soldiers for the murder of a Somali prisoner and systematic brutality and torture of other Somalis under Canadian control.

Afghanistan, Guantanamo and Iraq

Currently, U.S. military personnel from the Army, Navy and Marines have been court-martialed for the murder of Afghans and Iraqis and for the abuse of other Afghans and Iraqis.  The Schlesinger Report cited 300 cases of alleged abuse of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo.  The Report says that investigations into 155 cases were completed. Of those 155 cases, 66 or one-third of the abuse allegations were substantiated–55 in Iraq, 8 in Guantanamo and 3 in Afghanistan.  Of the 66 cases that substantiated abuse, 22, or one-third, took place during interrogation and five prisoners died as a result.

Those court-martialed personnel about whom we know the most are the seven U.S. Army Reserve military police, including three women, and one U.S. Army Reserve military intelligence soldier, all of whom appeared in the 29 publicly-released photos of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib.

But, as it turns out, other U.S. Army personnel have recently received some type of punishment pertaining to prisoner abuses.  On May 6, 2005, the U.S. Army announced that one colonel and two lieutenant colonels linked to detainee abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan were given unspecified administrative punishment.  Two other lieutenant colonels were given letters of reprimand. Three majors were given letters of reprimand and one of the three also was given an unspecified administrative punishment.  Three captains were court-martialed, one captain was given an other-than–honorable discharge from the Army, five captains received letters of reprimand and one was given an unspecified administrative punishment.  Two first lieutenants were court-martialed, one got a letter of reprimand and one was given administrative punishment.  One second lieutenant was given an other-than-honorable discharge and one was given a letter of reprimand.  Two chief warrant officers were court-martialed.  One woman Brigadier General received a written reprimand and was formally relieved of her command of the 800^th Military Police Brigade on April 8, 2005.  She was demoted to Colonel on April 5 but reportedly not in connection with prisoner abuse, but in failing to disclose a misdemeanor (shoplifting) on her paperwork for promotion to general officer.

The Army did not provide the names of those receiving punishment nor did it connect the punishment to the actions identified in the three reports commissioned by the U.S. Army (Taguba, Church, and Scheslinger Reports) or other offenses.  The Army also said other cases involving officers linked to detainee abuse are still open, but did not say how many (“Army Demotes General in Abu Ghraib Scandal,” by Robert Burns, AP, Washington Post.com, May 6, 2005).

One civilian contractor has been charged for abusing an Iraqi.  Many other U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors currently are under investigation for possible abuses in which they took part.

Numbers of Women

The numbers of women in the U.S. military steadily rose after I joined the Army in 1967 while the numbers of female soldiers in Military Police units and Military Intelligence units has increased substantially.

In Military Police

After the dissolution of the Women’s Army Corps in 1978, the Army allowed enlisted women to become military police and also officers in charge of Military Police units.  However, every deployment involved a battle for better utilization and opportunities for women in the MPs.  In the early 1980s, four women at Ft. Bragg, NC deployed to Grenada in Operation Urgent Fury with their military police unit.  After two days senior officers who believed the women should not have been in a combat area pulled the women out of Grenada and recalled them to Fort Bragg.   Women at Fort Bragg had previously fought against the disastrous limitation of women’s opportunities occasioned by the Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC).  In 1983, the Army established the DCPC to classify every position based on the likelihood of engaging in combat. For several days,  women, objecting to the redeployment of the four women substantially pressured 18^th Airborne Corps commander to relent and return the military police women to their unit in Grenada; he eventually complied..

Over the years, as the number of women in the Army increased, more and more women decided that the military police offered excellent training, leadership, management and promotion opportunities.

Female officers were selected to command MP companies and battalions and in the early-1980s, Brigadier General Pat Foote was the first female Military Police general officer.  She was the first woman to command a Brigade level military police unit and later became the Commanding General of the U.S. Army’s Fort Belvoir.  U.S. Army Reserve Brigadier General Janis Karpinski was selected as commander of the 800^th Military Police Brigade and was the first MP woman general to appear in a combat theater.

Data from the Women in Military Project shows that as of October, 2004, the active duty Army had 2289 enlisted military police women, or 15.6% of its 14,634 enlisted MP strength (12,343 men).  There were 443 women MP Officers or 21.6% of the 2,048 officers (1,605 men) on active duty with the Army.  The Army National Guard had 1186 women or 12% of its 9467 MP strength (8281 men).  These statistics did not provide an officer/enlisted breakdown. The Army Reserves had 1221 women in the MPs, 16% of the total of 7759 (6538 men). Again, there was no breakdown for officers and enlisted.

In the active Army, there were 198 enlisted women or 22% of the 889 personnel in the correctional 95C MOS (military occupation specialty–in this case, referring to correctional specialists within the Military Police).  In the Army Reserves, 9 women (30%) of only 30 enlisted personnel had the correctional MOS.  There were no personnel listed with the correctional MOS in the Army National Guard.

(Data from the September 30, 2004 Defense Statistics, obtained from WREI, Women in Military Project.  In 2004, the military changed the numerical MOS classifications.  This paper uses the older classifications as they appeared in the 2004 statistics.)

In Military Intelligence

Women found a niche in the military intelligence field.  The highest-ranking female general in the U.S. Army was three-star, Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy who in the late 1990s was deputy chief of staff of U.S. Army Intelligence. Currently the head of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center is a two-star Major General, Barbara Fast.

While women make up about 15% of the active duty Army, certain career fields in military intelligence have a much higher percentage.  For example, 25% of all enlisted interrogators are women (250 women out of 1004 in the 97E interrogator/translator MOS).  27% of all imagery analysts are women (236 out of 876 in 96D MOS).  19% of all counterintelligence personnel are women (314 of 1312 in 97B MOS.) 14% of psychological operation intelligence personnel and general analysts are women (894 of 5174 in 37F MOS).

Women make up 19% of the general intelligence officers of the active duty U.S. Army (803 of 4233) and 14% of the Army’s counterintelligence officers (61 of 437).

In the U.S. Army Reserves, women are 26% of the interrogators/translators/interpreters (72 of 275-97E MOS).  Women are 20% of the imagery analysts (39 of 192-96D MOS), 17% of the psychological operations and general intelligence analysts (435 of 2494-37F MOS) and 24% of counterintelligence personnel (124 of 521-97B MOS). There was no breakdown between enlisted and officers.

In the Army National Guard, women are 13% of the interrogator/translators/interpreters (64 of 494-97E MOS), 20% of imagery analysts (11 of 54-96D MOS), 14% of psychological operations and general intelligence analysts (216 of 1489-37F MOS) and 15% of counterintelligence personnel (75 of 500-97B MOS). There was no breakdown between enlisted and officers.

(Data from the September 30, 2004 Defense Statistics, obtained from WREI, Women in Military Project)

Afghanistan:  The Origins of a Policy

“Enemy Combatants” 

After September 11, 2001, women in many U.S. government agencies were called upon in the government’s response to Al Qaeda’s attacks.  In particular, women in military intelligence and military police units and women under contract with the Defense Department and with the Central Intelligence Agency were deployed to Afghanistan to serve as interrogators and guards in detention facilities at key U.S. military and CIA detention facilities including Baghram Air Base, Kandahar Air Base and the “Sugar Factory” in Kabul.

As the number of detainees in Afghanistan increased, chief lawyers (General Counsels) of the White House, Department of Defense, the Uniformed Military Services, the State Department, the CIA and the Department of Justice vigorously debated what status and protections should be given to detainees.  The Judge Advocate Generals of the four Uniformed Military Services, the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, and the Department of State’s General Counsel strongly recommended that detainees should be classified as prisoners of war and afforded the protections of the Geneva Convention.

However, the President agreed with the advice of White House legal counsel Antonio Gonzalez, now the Attorney General of the United States, and of the civilian General Counsel of the Department of Defense William Haynes III, recently appointed as a Federal Judge to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The detainees in Afghanistan would be classified as “enemy combatants” and receive none of the protections of the Geneva Convention.  Justice and White House lawyers coined the new legal term, “enemy combatant”.  The term allowed the administration to hold detainees for an indefinite period of time without access to legal counsel and without providing any identifying information about the detainee.

Response to Prison Riots and Massacre of Detainees in Transport

In December 2001, I participated in the first State Department team to go to Kabul and reopen the U.S. Embassy that had been closed for twelve years.  As the political officer and later the Deputy Chief of Mission or Deputy Ambassador, I worked with the U.S. military and the CIA, as well as with the new interim government of Afghanistan. In the northern part of Afghanistan, the U.S. military, CIA, and the Afghani warlords, whom the U.S. was paying to fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban, were detaining members of the Taliban, other Afghan citizens, and persons from other countries. The U.S. military and CIA were capturing some al Qaeda members in the mountainous region bordering Pakistan.

Working with U.S. Special Forces teams, Northern Alliance warlord General Dostum had captured an estimated 5000 Taliban around the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and had taken many of them to a medieval prison called Sheboygan.  As the prisoners, including the American John Walker Lind, were being interrogated, they rioted and attacked and killed several of their Afghan and American captors including CIA interrogator, Mike Spann.  The response to this attack from Dostum’s forces and the U.S. military and CIA paramilitary operatives was fast and lethal; they flooded the prison basement where many detainees had fled and ignited gasoline in the tunnels leading to the basement to eliminate any opposition.

In a related incident, now known as the Afghan Convoy of Death, an estimated 3,000 Taliban who had surrendered in the northern area of Afghanistan were being transported in approximately twelve large metal containers on tractor-trailers to Sheboygan.  The containers had no ventilation systems and prisoners began beating on the walls of the containers begging for air.  The Afghan militia, with U.S. Special Forces and CIA personnel reportedly observing, fired their weapons into the containers to create air holes and, in the process, killed or seriously wounded hundreds of prisoners.  According to a documentary by the British Human Rights Watch, the containers filled with dead and dying prisoners were driven to Sheboygan.  Those who were still alive were interrogated for anything of intelligence value while the bodies of those who had been killed were checked for documents.  The bodies of at least 1500 of the Taliban were put back into the containers, driven to a desert area in northern Afghanistan and buried in the sands.   Recent Washington Post and New York Times articles recapped this incident in announcing the appointment of the warlord General Dostum as Deputy Defense Minister of the Afghan government.

Other U.S. military units and CIA personnel in Afghanistan must have learned about the treatment of Taliban prisoners following the Sheboygan riot and must have noticed the lack of cautionary direction from higher civilian and military authorities.  These incidents undoubtedly set the tone for future interactions with detainees in Afghanistan and ultimately in Guantanamo and Iraq.

The Department of Justice Retaliates Against One of Its Own: A Female Whistleblower

In November 2001, the FBI requested that Jesselyn Radack, an attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice in the Office of Professional Responsibility advise the agency on the interrogation of John Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban.”  Radack replied that Lindh’s father had requested counsel for Lindh, and therefore, any information gained without a defense lawyer being present could be used for national security or intelligence-gathering purposes, but could not be used in the criminal prosecution of Lindh.  Later the Justice Department used Lindh’s statements from the interrogation (with no lawyer) as the basis for a ten-count indictment against him.  The presiding judge in the Lindh case requested that all correspondence about the conditions of Lindh’s interrogation be sent to him. The Justice Department forwarded only two of more than a dozen Radack emails.  Neither of the two reflected Radack’s opinion that the Department of Justice’s actions had been unethical.  When she asked her supervisor why the other emails had not been forwarded, the supervisor said there were only two emails.  Radack found that all other emails had been erased from the Department of Justice’s server.   Professionals in the communications system discovered the purged emails that Radack forwarded to the judge. Her supervisors at DOJ retaliated with blistering work reports.  She resigned from DOJ and obtained a position with a prestigious law firm in Washington.  DOJ informed the law firm that DOJ was instituting criminal proceedings against Radack, as well as requesting that the District of Columbia and Maryland Bars disbar Radack.

Although she had never been arrested, charged, afforded a court hearing or convicted, the law firm let Radack go and at present, the Yale Law School graduate, White House intern, and DOJ outstanding attorney, is unemployed and still fighting the effects of speaking out against DOJ’s mistreatment.  Currently she works pro bono for the American Bar Association and the Center for Constitutional Rights and speaks on the responsibility of citizens to question their government’s actions.

In the Federal Courthouse in Alexandria, Virginia on July 15, 2003, John Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban”, pleaded guilty to the charges that remained after the court eliminated the indictments based on the FBI”s illegally-obtained information. Lindh was sentenced to twenty years in prison.

In the treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan, many government agencies in November and December 2001 sacrificed professional ethics and accountability and thereby set the standard for subsequent attitudes toward detainees in Guantanamo and Iraq.

The Trail of Interrogation Techniques and Treatment of Detainees Leads from Afghanistan through Guantanamo to Iraq

A few men and women went from Afghanistan to Guantanamo and Iraq:  Major General Geoffrey Miller, a U.S. Army Reserve officer, was the third commander of the prison in Guantanamo and later head of prisons in Iraq. Carolyn A. Wood, U.S. Army Military Intelligence Officer, an officer with ten years experience as an enlisted interrogator, commanded Company A of the 519^th Military Intelligence Battalion and was the chief intelligence officer at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, where detainees were brought before they were sent to Guantanamo, Cuba.

In November 2001, two Afghan detainees died at the Bagram Detainee Control Point. The deaths took place nearly a year before the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Among those implicated in the killings at Bagram were members of Company A of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, from Fort Bragg, N.C–the Company that Captain Wood commanded. The Army Criminal Investigation Command reports said that the abuse at Bagram went far beyond the two killings. Among those recommended for prosecution was an Army military interrogator from the 519th Battalion who is said to have “placed his penis along the face” of one Afghan detainee and later to have “simulated anally sodomizing him (over his clothes).”  The Army reports cited “credible information” that four military interrogators assaulted two detainees by “kicks to the groin and leg, shoving or slamming him into walls/table, forcing the detainee to maintain painful, contorted body positions during interview and forcing water into his mouth until he could not breathe.” American military officials in Afghanistan initially said the deaths of one of these detainees in an isolation cell on Dec. 4, 2002, and of the other in another such cell six days later, were from natural causes. Lt. Gen. Daniel K. McNeill, the American commander of allied forces in Afghanistan at the time, denied then that prisoners had been chained to the ceiling or that conditions at Bagram endangered the prisoners’ lives. But after an investigation by The New York Times, the Army acknowledged that the deaths were homicides.

In the autumn of 2003, Army investigators implicated 28 soldiers and reservists and recommended that they face criminal charges, including negligent homicide. Private Brand, a military policeman from the 377th Military Police Company, an Army Reserve unit based in Cincinnati, and Sgt. James P. Boland, from the same unit, were charged in the murders.

Vice Adm. Albert T. Church’s investigation into intelligence activities reported on the deaths of the two Afghans as examples of abuse that had occurred during interrogations. However, Admiral Church said his review of the Army investigation had found that the abuse “was unrelated to approved interrogation techniques.” Church also said there were indications in both cases “that medical personnel may have attempted to misrepresent the circumstances of the death, possibly in an effort to disguise detainee abuse.”  Church noted that the Army’s surgeon general was reviewing “the specific medical handling” of those cases and one other.

Both men had been chained to the ceiling, one at the waist and one by the wrists, although their feet remained on the ground. A U.S. Army criminal investigative report stated that Captain Wood had lied to investigators by saying that shackling prisoners in standing positions was intended to protect interrogators from harm. In fact, the report says, the technique was used to inflict pain and sleep deprivation.

Eighteen months later in mid-2003, the 519^th Military Intelligence Battalion went to Iraq, where some members established the interrogation unit at Abu Ghraib and were implicated in some abuses there. Captain Wood established the interrogation and debriefing center at Abu Ghraib. Two Defense Department reports have said that a list of interrogation procedures she drew up, which went beyond those approved by Army commanders, may have contributed to abuses at Abu Ghraib.

Guantanamo’s Interrogation Techniques: Sexual Tactics and Female Interrogators

As more and more people were detained in Afghanistan in late 2001, the Department of Defense established a prison facility for those detainees who might have valuable information on terrorists and terrorist plans for the future.  Facilities at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba were quickly set up for over 600 detainees or “enemy combatants.”

According to U.S. Southern Command spokesman Lt. Col. James Marshall, in January 2005, about 20 percent of the military police guards at Guantanamo were women. While Marshall would not say how many of the interrogators were female, there are military and civilian female interrogators.   Some officials at the U.S. Southern Command have questioned the formation of an all-female team as one of Guantanamo’s “Immediate Reaction Force” units that subdue troublesome male prisoners in their cells, according to a document classified as secret and obtained by the Associated Press. (“Gitmo Soldier Details Sexual Tactics,” New York Times.com, January 28, 2005.)

The disturbing and degrading techniques that some female interrogators have used at Guantanamo have been widely publicized, including sexual touching, displaying of fake menstrual blood, and parading in miniskirts, tight T-shirts, bra and thong underwear.  According to a letter obtained by AP in December, 2004, the FBI has criticized these sexual tactics but U.S. officials have not acted on these complaints about “highly aggressive” interrogation techniques, including one in which a female interrogator grabbed a detainee’s genitals. (“Gitmo Soldier Details Sexual Tactics,” New York Times.com, January 28, 2005).

As there have been no reports of judicial or non-judicial punishments for such acts, the public is left to assume that the U.S. government approves such techniques. .

Guantanamo’s Interrogation Techniques: The Law and a Female Lawyer

In addition to female military police guards and military intelligence interrogators at Guantanamo, one of the top military lawyers there was a woman who wrote an important opinion on acceptable interrogation techniques. On 11 October 2002, LTC Diane E. Beaver, the Staff Judge Advocate for Guantanamo’s Joint Task Force 170, provided the Commander of JTF 170 with a seven-page memorandum, “Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies.” The brief analyzed the legality of interrogation techniques proposed by the Task Force Intelligence officer.   Her memo read:  “To ensure the security of the United Sates and its Allies, more aggressive interrogation techniques than the ones presently used, such as the methods proposed in the attached recommendation, may be required in order to obtain information from detainees that are resisting interrogation efforts and are suspected of having significant information essential to national security.”

LTC Beaver wrote: “With respect to the Category III advanced counter-resistance strategies, the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent is not illegal for the same reasons that there is a compelling governmental interest and it is not done intentionally to cause prolonged harm.  However, caution should be utilized with this technique because the torture statute specifically mentions making death threats as an example of inflicting mental pain and suffering.  Exposure to cold weather or water is permissible with appropriate medical monitoring.  The use of a wet towel to induce the misperception of suffocation would also be permissible if not done with the specific intent to cause prolonged mental harm, and absent medical evidence that it would.  Caution should be exercised with this method, as foreign courts have already advised about the potential mental harm that this method may cause.  The use of physical contact with the detainee, such as pushing and poking will technically constitute an assault under Article 128, UCMJ.”

LTC Beaver recommended that the Task Force commander approve the proposed methods of interrogation and that interrogators be properly trained in the use of all approved methods of interrogation.  Beaver added that “since the law requires examination of all facts under a totality of circumstances test, I further recommend that all proposed interrogations involving category II and III methods must undergo legal, medical, behavioral science, and intelligence review prior to the commencement.”   (“Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies” memorandum published in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Karen J. Freenberg and Joshua L. Dratel, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, pp 229-235.)

Iraq: the Coalition’s Immediate Need for Prisons and Interrogators

In March 2003, the speed of the U.S. military advance into Iraq outstripped the ability of units to protect infrastructure and people who came under its control as occupiers.  Public buildings were looted and critical physical infrastructure plants were systematically stripped, as the U.S. military did not have enough personnel to protect structures that were now under their care and responsibility.

The military had to deal with the remnants of Hussein’s military and security forces.  The coalition forces were not met with flowers but with guns and the coalition incarcerated many Iraqis, some of whom fought against coalition forces and others who were in the wrong place at the wrong time.  U.S. military operations plans did not have sufficient military police for the protection of facilities and the administration of prisons needed for the extraordinarily large numbers of detained Iraqis.

Prisons were quickly overcrowded.  Military police units with no training in prison administration or correction duties were designated to assume these jobs.  Additionally, thousands of imprisoned Iraqis needed to be interrogated.  With neither the discovery of weapons of mass destruction, nor Saddam Hussein, greater pressure was placed on the intelligence community to get more “actionable” intelligence from detainees.  Major General Geoffery Miller, the commander of Guantanamo prison, and 5 interrogation teams, were sent in October 2003 to Iraq to facilitate the interrogations at Abu Ghraib.  (“Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the US Abuse of Detainees,” Human Rights Watch, April 2005, Vol. 17, No. 1 [G])

The highest-ranking female officers ever to serve in a combat area were key officers in the incarceration and interrogation of detainees.  Major General Barbara Fast, an active duty officer, was the top intelligence officer in Iraq and responsible for interrogation policies for military intelligence units and interrogators in Iraq.  Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, a Reserve officer, was the commander of the 800^th Military Police Brigade and was in charge of all prisons in Iraq.

The Abuse at Abu Ghraib:

Military Police

While the public has focused on the actions of members of the 372^nd MP Company at Abu Ghraib, in May 2003, six months before the abuses occurred in Abu Ghraib, two women and two men from the U.S. Army Reserves, 320^th Military Police Battalion, Ashley, Pennsylvania, were court-martialed, for mistreating Iraqi detainees at Camp Bucca when a riot broke out while the unit was escorting detainees.

The 372nd MP Company was mobilized in February 2003 and received no training in running a facility for prisoners of war, although the 372nd received instruction in handling individual prisoners.   The Company arrived in Kuwait in June 2003 and then deployed to the city of Hilla in southern Iraq where the Company helped train a reconstituted Iraqi police force.  In October 2003, the 372nd was sent to Abu Ghraib which was severely overcrowded and critically understaffed; the prison held more than 7,000 prisoners at three sites, two tent camps and one hardened prison structure.  (“Members of the 372^nd MP Company never bargained for notoriety,” by Michael A. Fucoco and Cindi Lash, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 14, 2004.)

The company commander Captain Reese testified that the company was trained for convoy escort work and that they were vastly understaffed while serving as prison guards at Abu Ghraib. (“Letter suggest abuse appalled Abu Ghraib Guard,” HoustonChronicle.com, May 16, 2005.)

The 29 photographs of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib released by the Department of Defense in April 2004 feature US Army Reservists, particularly the three women MP reservists from the 372^nd MP Company.  DOD showed U.S. Congressional committees hundreds if not thousands of photos and several videos of soldier misconduct.  DOD has declined to make the photos available to the public, despite the request from two members of Congress.

Who are in the other photos and what was their conduct?  Have others been held accountable for their actions?

The military police personnel who were court-martialed in October and November 2003 as a result of the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib were from the U.S. Army Reserves.

Seven are from one Military Police company based in a small Maryland town, Cresaptown.  The company deployed to Iraq with 135 personnel, including 16 women, or 12% of the unit; 3 women, or 19% of the 16 women in the unit, have been court-martialed.  Of the 119 men in the unit, 4 or 3% of the men have been court-martialed.

Military Intelligence

As I mentioned previously, the highest-ranking woman to serve in Iraq was the Chief of Intelligence for the U.S. Forces.  Major General Barbara Fast served from July 2003 to June 2004 as the intelligence chief for Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the U.S. military ground commander in Iraq. Fast oversaw the interrogation centers at Abu Ghraib prison,.  Several senior Army officers, including General Fast, knew by November 2003 that the Red Cross had complained about problems at Abu Ghraib, including forced nudity and physical and verbal abuse of prisoners.

One Military Intelligence U.S. Army Reserve male soldier from the 325^th Military Intelligence Battalion was court-martialed in connection with the October-November, 2003 Abu Ghraib events.

The only other Military Intelligence person to receive punishment for the events of Abu Ghraib is Colonel Tom Pappas, Commander of the 205^th Military Intelligence Brigade.  On May 6, 2005 he received non-judicial punishment for two counts of dereliction of duty: 1) failing to ensure that subordinates were “adequately informed of, trained upon, and supervised in the application of interrogation procedures” allowed under Army rules; 2). Failing to obtain the approval of superior commanders before allowing the presence of military working dogs during interrogation of a detainee. He received a Letter of Reprimand.

Some of the U.S. Army personnel mentioned in the May 6 announcement of judicial and non-judicial punishments may be Military Intelligence personnel.        

Military Doctors

In the January 6, 2005 New England Journal of Medicine, an article entitled “Perspective” alleged that U.S. Army doctors violated the Geneva Conventions by helping intelligence officers carry out abusive interrogations at military detention centers and might have participated in torture.  The article alleged that medical personnel helped tailor interrogations to the physical and mental conditions of individual detainees at Abu Ghraib and at Guantanamo.

Based on interviews with more than two dozen military personnel and on a review of documents released to the American Civil Liberties Union under the Freedom of Information Action, the Journal of Medicine article reported that medical workers gave interrogators access to patients’ medical files and that psychiatrists and other physicians collaborated with interrogators and guards who, in turn, deprived detainees of sleep, restricted them to diets of bead and water, and exposed them to extreme heat and cold. The article noted, “Clearly, the medical personnel who helped to develop and execute aggressive counter-resistance plans thereby breached the laws of war.”    The article also maintained that the Army’s surgeon general is developing new rules for medical personnel who work with detainees.  (“Medical Workers Helped Tailor Interrogations of Detainees, Article Says,” by Joe Stephens, Washington Post, January 6, 2005)

Additionally the Fay Report mentions that a Military Intelligence sergeant found a detainee at Abu Ghraib without clothes or blanket.  His wounds were bleeding and he had a catheter without a bag.  The MPs told the sergeant that they had no clothes for the detainee.  The sergeant asked the MPs to get the detainee some clothes and went to the medical site to get the doctor on duty.  The doctor (a colonel) said he was aware the detainee still had a catheter and the Combat Army Surgical Hospital had made a mistake and the colonel couldn’t remove it because the CASH was responsible for it. The sergeant told him this was unacceptable; he again refused to remove it and stated that the detainee was due to go back to the CASH the following day.  The sergeant asked if the colonel had ever heard of the Geneva Conventions, and the colonel responded “Fine, sergeant, you do what you have to do.  I am going back to bed.” (The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs LLC, 2004, p 139, 161-163)

The Fay Report states that medical personnel may have been aware of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and failed to report it.  The Fay investigation covered the involvement of Military Intelligence personnel.  The investigators unsuccessfully requested missing medical records.   The Fay Report recommended that an inquiry should be conducted into 1) whether appropriate medical records were maintained, and if so, were they properly sorted and collected and 2) whether medical personnel were aware of detainee abuse and failed to properly document and report the abuse.  (“Report on AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205^th Military Intelligence Brigade”, MG George R. Fay, investigation officer, August 23, 2004)

Legal Aspects of Prisoner Abuses

Women military and civilian lawyers have been involved in prisoner abuses, from writing decision memos on how much physical and emotional pressure could be put on detainees during interrogation, to prosecuting, defending and adjudicating cases brought against military personnel.  A women lawyer in the Justice Department lost her job for telling the truth about the Department of Justice’s illegal use of information obtained from an American citizen who was held as a prisoner.

Conclusion.

Although the transcripts from the court-martial of the eight Reservists serving at Abu Ghraib have not been released, we can conclude from military pronouncements and from limited newspaper reports and General Karpinski’s several television interviews:

• That one’s position of authority over prisoners does seem to affect negatively some individual judgments on what is the right or wrong treatment of other humans, even during war.
• There was a policy of dehumanizing the enemy so those in authority would have less concern or guilt in using painful or humiliating techniques to elicit information.
• U.S. Army Reserve Military Police soldiers were not properly trained in prison guard duties.  Some claim their actions were legal as their supervisors approved of the actions, but most acknowledge that they knew morally their actions were wrong. Among the court-martialed, Specialist Harman took full responsibility for her actions and maintained that the decisions she made were hers and hers alone.
• The military and civilian legal, intelligence and police communities were confused as to what techniques could be applied during interrogation.
• Pronouncements from the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor, in which they maintained that the Geneva Convention protections did not apply, contributed to the environment in which excesses of “softening up” detainees for interrogation and actual interrogation techniques resulted in torture and abuse of prisoners.
• Even though the number of women in military police and intelligence units increased, it was not inevitable that women would be involved in prisoner abuses.  Sexual liaisons with their supervisors influenced some junior enlisted women; others said they went along with the abuse because everyone else did.  A few senior enlisted personnel urged others to beat up prisoners.  Supervising officers should have provided better training and increased supervision for those in their command who lacked training
• The pattern of abuses began in Afghanistan, continued to Guantanamo and culminated in Abu Ghraib, Iraq.  Officers in the prisons perpetuated the pattern.  These included Major General Geoffery Miller, commander of Guantanamo and now commander in Abu Ghaib; and Captain Carolyn Wood who was in Afghanistan and Iraq.
• As for the photos from Abu Ghraib, some members of the U.S. military and a few members of the U.S. Congress have seen the entire sets of photos and videos that depict prisoner abuse. We do not know how many photos there are, who is in them, or if they include active duty military police and intelligence, or other agency or contractor personnel.  It does seem very odd that of the 29 photos made available to the media, all 29 depicted U.S. Army Reserve personnel.  Additionally, the photos show a disproportionate number of women.
• Female soldiers were probably shown in order to deflect attention from others.   Photos of young women, one columnist called them” Torture Chicks,” would undoubtedly attract public attention.

All of my questions have not been resolved:

• Where were the active duty personnel in the prison?
• Why, after three major investigations of military police and military intelligence activities in Abu Ghraib prison, don’t we know the names of other personnel involved in the abuse of detainees?
•  Why have no active duty personnel been accused of being derelict in their supervision of interrogators?

And finally, yes, is it right to question decisions made by our civilian and military leaders during a war; in fact it is our obligation.  War does not relieve any one of their responsibilities to be accountable.

Women in Military Intelligence Associated with Prisons, Interrogation or Prisoner Abuse

Major General Barbara Fast, Chief of Intelligence:  Policy on Interrogations

Major General Barbara Fast served from July 2003 to June 2004 as the intelligence chief for Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the U.S. military ground commander in Iraq. In that capacity, she oversaw the interrogation centers at Abu Ghraib prison.  Several senior Army officers, including General Fast, knew by November 2003 that the Red Cross had complained about problems at Abu Ghraib, including forced nudity and physical and verbal abuse of prisoners.  For that reason, General Fast became a focus of several inquiries, including one led by a senior Navy officer, Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III.  Church was assigned to review interrogation techniques and procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan and at the prison camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. According to Admiral Church, “My purpose in talking to her [Fast] was [to discover] what she knew about the interrogation policies and what she knew about any instances of abuse and when she knew them, and I was able to document all that. She really was not particularly engaged in the interrogation techniques.”

In General Taguba’s report, General Fast is cited as having “detainee release authority,” in charge of deciding which inmates accused of crimes against the coalition could be released.

An independent panel led by a former defense secretary, James R. Schlesinger, concluded in August, 2004 that General Fast, then a brigadier general, failed to advise General Sanchez properly on directives to run the interrogation center, to conduct interrogation over all, and to monitor activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in military areas. As a result of the findings of the Schlesinger panel and other military inquiries, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the Army in September to review the cases of General Fast, General Sanchez, and three other senior officers in Iraq to determine whether any should be held accountable and disciplined. (“Former Intelligence Officer Cleared in Prison Abuse,” by Eric Schmitt, New York Times, March 12, 2005)

After reviewing the Church and Schlesinger reports, on March 11, 2005, the Army inspector general exonerated General Fast and she proceeded to take command of the Army’s Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., in March 2005.

Captain Carolyn Wood: Chief Interrogator in Afghanistan and Iraq 

Following her deployment to Afghanistan in 2001, Captain Wood and her unit were sent to Iraq in 2003.  Captain Wood was the Officer in Charge of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center of the 519 Military Intelligence Battalion.  Her performance in Iraq was investigated as a part of the prisoner abuse scandal.  Major General George R. Fay’s investigatory Report on AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205^th Military Intelligence Brigade was released on August 23, 2004. The report (page 123) found that a preponderance of evidence supports that CPT Wood failed to:

–implement the necessary checks and balances to detect and prevent detainee abuse. Given her knowledge of prior abuse in Afghanistan, as well as the reported sexual assault of a female detainee by three 519 Military Intelligence Battalion soldiers working the ICE, CPT Wood should have been aware of the potential for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.  As the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) she was in a position to take steps to prevent further abuse.  Her failure to do so allowed the abuse to go undetected and unchecked.

–assist in gaining control of a chaotic situation during the IP Roundup, even after SGT Eckroth approached her for help.

–provide proper supervision. Should have been more alert due to the following incidents:

• An ongoing investigation on the 519 MI BN in Afghanistan;
• Prior reports of 519 MI BN interrogators conducting unauthorized interrogation;
• SOLDIER-29’s reported use of nudity and humiliation techniques;
• Quick Reaction Force (QRF) allegations of detainee abuse by 519^th MI soldiers;
• Failure to properly review interrogation plans that clearly specified the improper use of nudity and isolation in interrogations and as punishment;
• Failure to ensure that soldiers were properly trained to do interrogation techniques and operations;
• Failure to adequately train soldiers and civilians on the ICRP.

General Fay recommended that the report should be forwarded to Captain Wood’s chain of command for appropriate action.  There is no report that any action was taken by Wood’s unit concerning these failures.

Iraq

Sgt. Adams, Military Intelligence, 470th Military Intelligence Group

Sergeant Adams, 470^th Military Intelligence Group, is the previously-mentioned sergeant who sometime between 4 and 13 December 2003, several weeks after the shooting of “a detainee who had a pistol” (Detainee-06), found Detainee-06 without clothes or blanket.  She is the sergeant who had a confrontation with the doctor over Detainee-06’s condition. (The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs LLC, 2004, p 139, 161-163)

Soldier-25, Interrogator, 321^st Military Intelligence Battalion

Soldier-25, Interrogator, 321^st Military Intelligence Battalion did not use MI channels to report the abuse of three detainees who were incarcerated for criminal acts and were not of intelligence interest.  Soldier-25 felt it was a military police matter and would be handled by them. Soldier-25 asked the MPs what had happened to detainee-07’s ear that allegedly was cut and required stitches.  She was told he had fallen in his cell.  Soldier-25 did not report the detainee’s abuse.  She claimed the allegation about the detainee was made in the presence of Civilian-21, analyst/interrogator (employed by contractor CACI International. P. 151). Soldier-25 characterized Civilian -21 as having a close relationship with the MPs.  Soldier 25 said that Sergeant Frederick told her that Civilian-21 was present when dogs were used.  It is highly plausible that Civilian-21 used dogs without authorization and directed the abuse in this and other incidents involving this detainee.  p. 153-154.

Incident No. 32.  In yet another instance, Soldier-25, an interrogator, stated that when she and Soldier-15 were interrogating a female detainee in the Hard Site, they heard a dog barking.  Dogs frightened the female detainee, and Soldier-25 and Soldier-15 returned her to her cell.  Soldier-25 went to investigate what was happening and saw a detainee in his underwear on a mattress on the floor of Tier 1A with a dog standing over him.  Civilian-21 was upstairs giving directions to Staff Sergeant Frederick (372 MP Company), telling him to “take him back home.”  Soldier-25 opined it was “common knowledge that Civilian-21 used dogs while he was on special projects, working directly for Colonel Pappas after the capture of Saddam on 13 December 2003.” Soldier-25 could not identify anyone else specifically who knew of this “common knowledge.”  Soldier-25 stated that Sergeant Frederick would come into her office every other day or so and tell her about dogs being used while Civilian-21 was present.  Sergeant Frederick and other MPs used to refer to “doggy dance” sessions.  Soldier-25 did not specify what “doggy dance” was, but the obvious implication is that it referred to an unauthorized use of dogs to intimidate detainees.

The Fay report found that “A preponderance of evidence supports that SOLDIER-25 failed to report detainee abuse in that:

–She saw dog handlers use dogs to scare detainees.  She “thought it was funny” as the detainees would run into their cells away from the dogs.

–SOLDIER-24 told her that the detainees who allegedly had raped another detainee were handcuffed together, naked, in contorted positions, mimicking a sexual act.

–She was told that MPs made the detainees wear women’s underwear.

–She failed to stop detainee abuse

The Fay Report recommended that the information should be forward to SOLDIER-25’s chain of command for appropriate action. (“Report on AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205^th Military Intelligence Brigade,” MG George R. Fay, investigation officer, August 23, 2004)

Soldier-29, Interrogator, 66 Military Intelligence Group

According to the Fay Report, on 16 November 2003, Soldier-29, a female, decided to strip a detainee in response to what she believed was uncooperative and physically recalcitrant behavior.  She had submitted an Interrogation Plan in which she planned to use the “Pride and Ego Down,” technique but did not specify that she would strip the detainee as part of that approach.  Soldier-29 felt the detainee was “arrogant,” and when she and her analyst, Soldier-10, “placed him against the wall” the detainee pushed soldier-10.  Soldier-29 warned if he touched Soldier-10 again, she would have him remove his shoes.  A pattern became established: Soldier-29 would warn the detainee about touching Soldier-10, the detainee would “touch” Solder-10, and the detainee subsequently had his shirt, blanket, and finally his pants removed.  At this point, Soldier-29 concluded that the detainee was “completely uncooperative” and terminated the interrogation. While nudity seemed to be an acceptable technique, Soldier-29’s behavior in walking the semi-naked detainee across the camp was more abusive than most interrogators who used nudity as a technique.  Sergeant Adams, Soldier-29’s supervisor, commented that walking a semi-naked blanket-carrying detainee in his underwear across camp could have caused a riot.

Civilian-29 notified Sergeant Adams about Soldier-29’s behavior.  Adams in turn notified Captain Wood, the Interrogation and Control Element’s officer in charge.  Sergeant Adams immediately called Soldier-29 and Soldier-10 into her office, counseled them, and removed them from interrogation duties.  Lt Col Jordan temporarily removed Soldier-29 and Soldier-10 from interrogation duties.  Colonel Pappas left the issue for Lt Col Jordan to handle. The Taguba report said that Colonel Pappas should have taken sterner action and that in failing to do so, he failed to communicate that such behavior would not be tolerated to the rest of the Joint Interrogation and Detention Center.  Captain Wood had recommended to Lt. Col Jordan that Soldier-29 receive a stronger punishment, and SFC Johnson, the interrogation non-commissioned officer in charge, recommended that she be turned over to her parent unit for the noncompliance.

In another incident, Soldier-29 interrogated Detainee-08 during his first four interrogations.  Detainee-08 claimed that he was without clothes and a blanket for nine days before Corporal Graner and SSG Frederick beat him.  The Fay report noted that Sgt Adams stated that Soldier-29 and SSG Frederick had a close personal relationship.  Possibly, Soldier-29 had Corporal Graner and SSG Frederick “soften up this detainee” as  Graner and Frederick have claimed “MI” told them to do on several, unspecified occasions. (The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs LLC, 2004, p 124.)

The Fay report found that SOLDIER-29, Interrogator, 66 MI Group, failed to report detainee abuse:

• She saw CPL Graner slap a detainee;
• She saw a computer screen saver depicting naked detainees in a “human pyramid;”
• She was aware MPs were taking photos of detainees;
• She knew MPs had given a detainee a cold shower, made him roll in the dirt, and stand outside in the cold until he was dry. The detainee was then given another cold shower;
• She violated interrogation rules of engagement by stripping a detainee of his clothes and walking him naked from an interrogation booth to Camp Vigilant on a cold winter night;
• She gave MPs instructions to mistreat/abuse detainees;
• What she said to MPs (SSG Frederick) when detainees had not cooperated in an interrogation appeared to result in subsequent abuse;
• One of the detainees she interrogated was placed in isolation for several days and allegedly abused by the MPs;
• In an interrogation report (IN-AG00992-DETAINEE-08-04), she noted that a “direct approach” was used with “the reminder of the unpleasantness that occurred the last time he lied to us.”

The Fay report recommended that the information be forwarded to SOLDIER-29’s chain of command for appropriate action.  (“Report on AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205^th Military Intelligence Brigade,” MG George R. Fay, investigation officer, August 23, 2004 , p 128, and  The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs LLC, 2004, p 124)

Civilian-15 (female contract interpreter)

According to the Fay Report, as Master-at-Arms First Class Kimbro, USN, and his dog approached a cell door, he heard yelling and screaming and his dog became agitated.  Inside the cell were Civilian -11 (CACI contract interrogator), a second unidentified male in civilian clothes who appeared to be an interrogator, and Civilian-15 (female contract interpreter), all of whom were yelling at a detainee squatting in the back right corner.  As Civilian-11, Civilian-16, and the other interrogators re-entered the cell, Kimbros’s dog grabbed Civilian -16’s forearm in its mouth.  It apparently did not bite through her clothes or skin and Civilian-16 stated the dog did not bite her.

(“Report on AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205^th Military Intelligence Brigade,” MG George R. Fay, investigation officer, August 23, 2004, p 133, and The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs, LLC, 2004, p 147)

Civilian-16, Translator, Titan employee

The Fay report found that: CIVILIAN-16, Translator, Titan employee failed to report detainee abuse:

• She participated in an interrogation during the IP Roundup, where a dog was brought into a cell in violation of approved ICRP;
• She participated in the interrogation of an Iraqi Policeman who was placed in a stress position, squatting backwards on a plastic lawn chair.  Any sudden movement b the IP could have resulted in injury (Reference Annex I, Appendix 2, Photograph “Stress Positions”);
• She was present during an interrogation when SSG Frederick twisted the handcuffs of a detainee, causing the detainee pain;
• She was present when SSG Frederick covered an IP’s mouth and nose, restricting the detainee from breathing;
• She failed to report threats against detainees.  She was present when CIVILIAN-11 told a detainee, “You see that dog there, if; you do not tell me what I want to know, I’m going to get that dog on you.”
• She was present when CIVILIAN-11 threatened a detainee “with SSG Frederick.”

Additionally, Master-at-Arms First Class Kimbro’s dog, as mentioned above, grabbed Civilian-16’s forearm when the dog became highly agitated at a interrogation scene.

The Fay report recommended that the information should be forwarded to the Army General Counsel for determination of whether CIVILIAN-16 should be referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution.

(“Report on AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205^th Military Intelligence Brigade,” MG George R. Fay, investigation officer, August 23, 2004, p133 and The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public AffairsLLC, 2004, p 147)

Female Civilian Contract Interpreter “Maher”

Incident No. 35.  On 19 September 2003, an interrogation ”Tiger Team” consisting of Soldier-16, Soldier -07 and a civilian contract interpreter identified only as “Maher,” (female), conducted a late night/early morning interrogation of a 17-year-old Syrian foreign fighter.  Soldier-16 was the lead interrogator. Soldier-07 couldn’t recall who ordered the detainee to raise his hands to his sides, but when he did, the bag covering him fell to the floor, exposing him to Soldier-07 and the two female interrogation team members.  Having a detainee raise his hands to expose himself in front of two females is humiliation and therefore violates the Geneva Conventions.  (The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs LLC, 2004 p 158)

Unidentified female interrogator

On October 20, 2003, Detainee-03 was allegedly stripped and physically abused for sharpening a toothbrush into a shank.  He claimed he was taken to a closed room where cold water was poured on him and his face was forced into someone’s urine.  He claimed he was then beaten with a broom and spat upon, and a female soldier stood on his legs and pressed a broom against this anus.  (The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs LLC, 2004, p 130)

Unidentified female interpreter

Incident No. 22.  On an unknown date, an interpreter named “Civilian-01” allegedly raped a 15-to-18-year-old male detainee, according to Detainee-05.  A female soldier was taking pictures. (The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs LLC, 2004, p 130)

SPC Luciana Spencer, 205^th MI Brigade

On 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer, 205^th MI Brigade degraded a detainee by having him strip and return to his cell naked (Torture book, p. 416.)

Guantanamo

Major Beth Richards, Officer in charge of all military and civilian linguists assigned to the Joint Intelligence Group

Michelle (not her real name, but Eric Saar gave her that name in Inside the Wire), OGA (other government agency, usually CIA), graduate of University of Pennsylvania, interrogator who used reasonable techniques with detainee from Morocco and with another detainee who had worked for Aljazerra, the Qatar-based Arabic news network.

Vanessa (Eric Saar pseudonym), US Army, E-4, U.S. Army Arabic linguist and a linguist shift leader of one of the prison blocks. (Saar refers to her as blond, blue-eyed and extremely busty, p 53)

Lisa (Eric Saar pseudonym), US Army, E-4, U.S. Army Arabic linguist, worked in the Joint Intelligence Group

Nadia (Eric Saar pseudonym), U.S. Army, Arabic linguist and co-supervisor of Eric Saar, at the Joint Intelligence Group, disobeyed verbal orders of the S-2 in Guantanamo to stay after the date of her written orders returning her to her unit at Fort Meade. She received administrative punishment at Fort Meade for disobeying the verbal order in Guantanamo.

Samantha (Eric Saar pseudonym), U.S. Army interrogator, who interrogated a detainee from Saudi Arabia about a safehouse in Kandahar

Brooke (Eric Saar pseudonym), U.S. Army interrogator, interrogated a Saudi named Fareek who was suspected of taking flight lessons in Arizona.  She took off her shirt and in her T-shirt rubbed her breasts against his back and rubbed red ink on him and called it her menstrual blood.

Female interrogator, unknown if military or civilian, working at Guantanamo

The Associated Press reported Monday (Dec 6, 2004) that an FBI official wrote a memorandum about witnessing a series of coercive procedures at Guantanamo, including a female interrogator squeezing the genitals of a detainee and bending back his thumbs painfully. (“Memos Say 2 Officials Who Saw Prison Abuse Were Threatened” New York Times, December 7, 2004)

Unknown number of contract civilian female interrogators

Some women interrogators at Guantanamo have used disturbing and degrading techniques, including sexual touching, displays of fake menstrual blood, and parading in miniskirts, tight T-shirts, bras and thong underwear.  Inside the Wire by Eric Saar, 2005

Military Police Women Involved in Aspects of Prisoner Abuse

Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, 300^th Military Police Brigade, US Army Reserves

Brigadier General Janis Karpinski was the commander of the 300^th Military Police Brigade, U.S. Army Reserves, and in charge of the Abu Ghraib prison during the period that the abuses of prisoners occurred.  She is a U.S. Army Reserve officer.

The Taguba report recommended that she be relieved from command and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for failing to:

• ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for dealing with detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs;
• ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands;
• obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer misconduct;
• take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum;
• take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4;
• properly ensure the results and recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation reports on escapes and shootings (over a period of several months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinate commanders;
• ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards throughout her command;
• establish a Brigade METL;
• establish basic proficiency in assigned tasks for soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade;
• ensure that numerous and reported accountability lapses at detention facilities throughout Iraq were corrected.

In January 2005 she was given a letter of reprimand and on April 8, she was suspended from command of the 300^th Military Police Brigade.  On May 4, 2005 Karpinski was demoted one rank to Colonel for failure to disclose during her background check to become a general officer that she had been arrested for shoplifting a $22 bottle of perfume and for dereliction of duty.  The military did not specify whether the dereliction of duty charge referred to prison responsibilities or to the failure to report the shoplifting incident.

On March 1, 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a civil complaint against Karpinski in the U.S. District Court, District of South Carolina, Beaufort Division alleging that Karpinski violated her legal duty by failing to stop torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment when she learned of it.  The complaint alleges that despite many credible and reliable reports of torture from governmental and non-governmental sources during her command, she failed to take reasonable, necessary, timely and meaningful measures to prohibit and prevent abuses and to punish perpetrators.  In doing so, she violated her obligations as a commander and acted with deliberate indifference and conscious disregard of the high risk of injuries inflicted on detainees and the violations of law committed by her subordinates.  The complaint alleges that these actions and omissions caused the torture and abuses to continue and to spread.  The ACLU on the same day initiated civil complaints against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, former commander of U.S. Forces in Iraq Lieutenant General Sanchez and Colonel Pappas, commander of the 205^th Military Intelligence Brigade that conducted interrogations in Abu Ghraib.

Prior to the revelation of the prison abuses of Abu Ghraib, two military police women from the 320^th Military Police Batallion, U.S. Army Reserves had been court-martialed for mistreating Iraqi detainees:

Master Sergeant Lisa Girman

Master Sergeant Lisa Girman, of the 320^th Military Police Battalion, an Army Reserve Unit from Ashley, Pennsylvania, was convicted of mistreating Iraqi detainees at Camp Bucca, Iraq on May 12, 2003 when a riot broke out while the unit was escorting detainees.  Girman, a Pennsylvania state trooper, was found guilty of dereliction of duty and maltreatment of an Iraqi detainee “by knocking him to the ground, repeatedly kicking him in the groin, abdomen and head and encouraging her subordinate soldiers to do the same,” an army statement said.  She and two others in her unit accepted a less-than-honorable discharge in a plea bargain. Their punishment included forfeited pay, 30 days extra duty and 30 days restricted duty at their base.  (New York Times, May 9, 2004 “In Abuse, a Portrayal of Ill-Prepared, Overwhelmed G.I.’s”, Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt)

Sergeant Shawna Edmondson

Sergeant Shawna, accepted a discharge “under other than honorable” conditions in November, 2003 in lieu of court martial.

Abu Ghraib and the 372^nd Military Police Company (U.S. Army Reserves, Maryland)

Specialist Sabrina Harman

Specialist Sabrina Harman27 years old, was court-martialed on May 16, 20005 at Fort Hood, Texas on one six of seven charges for her role in the abuse of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison.  She was convicted of one count of conspiracy to maltreat detainees, four counts of maltreating detainees and one count of dereliction of duty.  She was acquitted of one count of maltreatment of a detainee.  She was sentenced on May 17, 2005 to 180 days in prison and given a bad-conduct discharge.

The Taguba Report stated that SPC Harman swore that in  the incident where a detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, “her job was to keep detainees awake.”  She stated that Military Intelligence (MI) was talking to CPL Graner.  She stated: “MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Graner and Frederick’s job to do things for MI and Other Governmental Agencies (OGA) to get these people to talk.”  Harman was accused of writing “rapeist [sic]” on the leg of another prisoner.  In one photo, Harman gestured thumbs-up while posing with the corpse of an Iraqi detainee allegedly beaten by Navy SEALs at Abu Ghraib.  The detainee later died while being interrogated by CIA agents (“Infamous Pics Allowed in Abu Ghraib Trial,” by TA Badger, May 11, 2005, Washingtonpost.com)

When home on leave in November 2003, Harman gave a disc with photos to her roommate. She said she wanted to give the photos to higher ups after her tour of duty. She couldn’t report anything while in Iraq because her superiors were “aware of the actions taking place against the prisoners.”

In her court martial the testimony of two Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib was read into the record.  They said that Harman’s gentle treatment was unique among the guards in that part of the prison reserved mostly for detainees believed to have intelligence value.

Specialist Megan M. Ambuhl

Specialist Megan Ambuhl, 30 years old, entered a plea bargain on October 24, 2004, in a summary court-martial in Baghdad.  Prosecutors agreed to drop charges of conspiracy, maltreatment of detainees and indecent acts. She pleaded guilty to one charge of dereliction of duty, accepting responsibility for not preventing or reporting detainee abuses, according to her civilian lawyer and military officials in Iraq. In a summary court-martial, which spared her the possibility of a lengthy prison term, Ambuhl was sentenced to a reduction in rank from specialist to private and was ordered to forfeit half of one month’s pay.

Ambuhl was the third soldier from the 372nd Military Police Company to plead guilty to charges connected with the scandal that broke in April after photographs of detainee abuse surfaced. One soldier was sentenced to a year in prison, and another to eight years.

According to investigative documents, Ambuhl was the least involved in the abuse. She was accused in large part of watching abusive acts and failing to report them. Harvey Volzer, Ambuhl’s Washington-based civilian attorney, said that his client witnessed some abusive acts on Tier 1 of the prison but did not report them because her superiors were involved and military intelligence soldiers appeared to be sanctioning the acts. Volzer said Ambuhl regrets not doing something to stop the abuses and shows remorse. According to investigative documents, Ambuhl was present when sexual abuses occurred in the prison’s most secure wing, including episodes when soldiers placed naked and hooded detainees into a pyramid and then posed with them for photographs. She is also partially visible in a photograph that showed Pfc. Lynndie R. Englund holding a leash attached to a naked detainee’s neck.

The documents show several detainees praised Ambuhl for treating them well, and in at least one instance she came to the aid of a detainee who was having trouble breathing after being punched in the chest by another soldier. (“Abu Ghraib Prison MP Pleads Guilty to Reduced Charge” By Josh White, Washington Post, November 3, 2004.)

Private Lynndie Englund

Court-martial charges against Private Lynndie Englund, were thrown out on May 12 when a military judge considered Private Charles Graner’s testimony.  Graner had ordered Englund to remove a prisoner from a cell by a leash as a legitimate military exercise.  (Hence, the now-iconic photograph of Englund holding the detainee by a leash.) The judge considered the testimony a contradiction of Private England’s admission of guilt and threw out her plea.

The final charges at the first court-martial against Pfc. Englund significantly reduced the Army reservist’s potential prison sentence should she be convicted of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Englund faces a maximum of 16 1/2 years in prison on nine criminal counts. According to the new charge sheets, Englund was accused of two counts of conspiracy, one count of dereliction of duty, four counts of cruelty and maltreatment of detainees, and two counts of “indecent acts.” Allegations of assault were dropped. Much of the prison time Englund faces centers on two so-called indecent acts: one a photograph of Englund pointing at the genitals of naked detainees; and the other capturing a consensual sexual act with Spec. Charles A. Graner Jr. in a spare prison cell. Each charge carries a maximum of five years.  Graner is the father of Englund’s child but has since married Meagan Ambuhl.  Graner was senior in rank to Englund at the time of the prisoner abuses.

Englund’s lawyer said the new charges bring her potential for prison time somewhat closer — but not yet in line with — the sentences imposed on those who have been convicted and sentenced in the scandal. Graner was given 10 years; Sgt. Ivan L. “Chip” Frederick got eight years. “I think the charges more closely reflect what she’s accused of doing; however, when you look at it proportionately to the others, she’s definitely being charged with a heavier hand by the same prosecutors the others had,” said Richard A. Hernandez, England’s civilian defense lawyer. “It’s because she’s a woman, and it’s because she became the face of this.”

Military prosecutors initially said Englund had no duties at the prison, but then they  charged that she was derelict in her duty to protect detainees there.(“Military Files New Charges in Scandal: Pfc. England Faces Less Prison Time”, by Josh White, Washington Post,  February 18, 2005; Page A25 )

Specialist Hannah Schlegel

Specialist Hannah Schlegel reported that in November 2003, a soldier came to her upset because he’d seen two prisoners naked and tied together and forced to crawl like dogs on leashes.  She reported the incident to a sergeant, who said he would report the allegations to the officer in charge, Sgt Frederick. (Taguba Report)

Unidentified Female Military Police

In October 2003, Detainee 07 reported alleged multiple incidents of physical abuse while in Abu Ghraib.  During this period a police stick was used to sodomize Detainee-07 and two female MPs were hitting him, throwing a ball at his penis and taking photographs. (The Abu Ghraib Investigations, ed. Steven Strasser, Public Affairs LLC, 2004, p 126.)

Military Medical Personnel

Abu Ghraib

Medical Specialist Helga Margot Aldape-Moreno

Medical Specialist Aldape-Moreno told investigators that in September 2003 she reported to the cell to tend to a prisoner having a panic attack. Opening the door, she saw naked Iraqis in a human pyramid, with sandbags over their heads.  Military police officers were yelling at the detainees.  She tended to the prisoner, then left the room and did not report what she saw until the investigation at Abu Ghraib began in January 2004.

Soldier-01, Medic

The Fay Report notes that SOLDIER-01 failed to report detainee abuse.  She saw a ‘human pyramid” of naked Iraqi prisoners, all with sandbags on their heads when called to the Hard Site to provide medical treatment. The Report recommended that this information should be forwarded to SOLDIER-01’s chain of command for appropriate action. (“Report on AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205^th Military Intelligence Brigade,” MG George R. Fay, investigation officer, August 23, 2004, p 130)