Maduro’s maneuvering against opposition attacks following the presidential elections.
One of the few advantages of being a country systematically besieged with increasing intensity for more than a quarter of a century is that its leaders become increasingly adept at defense and counterattack.
This is one of the conclusions that can be drawn from the events following the Venezuelan presidential elections of July 28, which are still unfolding. The actions taken by the adversaries of the Bolivarian revolution have been countered one by one, so far with a favorable balance for the re-elected president, Nicolás Maduro.
The Parallel Government Strategy
One of the key maneuvers was the statement by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, recognizing opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia as the winner of the elections, openly contradicting the official result given by the only competent body in the matter, the National Electoral Council (CNE), which proclaimed Maduro the winner.
Faced with what appeared to be a repeat of the interim government of former lawmaker Juan Guaidó (who proclaimed himself president in 2019 and was endorsed by Washington, the European Union, and neighboring Latin American countries), Maduro launched a torpedo at the imperial waterline: if the U.S. does not recognize his victory, the energy contracts awarded to U.S. companies will be handed over to companies from the BRICS group, which Venezuela is hoping to join soon.
Immediately afterward, State Department spokesperson Mathew Miller employed mental gymnastics to explain that while the U.S. considers González the winner of the elections, it has not recognized him as the president of Venezuela.
As of Tuesday, August 6, Washington’s official position is still unclear, having elevated the trio of governments seeking a resolution to the conflict (Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico) to the status of “partners.”
This demonstrates not only that Maduro’s government has learned to defend itself against such interventionist strategies but also how much the geopolitical balance of power has shifted in just a few years. When the US recognized Guaidó, numerous countries followed suit. This time, a world with significant problems, a more politically balanced Latin American scenario, and the US facing severe economic difficulties have allowed Maduro to solidly counter the attack.
An initial attempt to reach a continental consensus to delegitimize the elections, through a resolution of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS), failed. Venezuela is no longer even a member of the OAS. The combined efforts of the governments of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Gustavo Petro dismantled that first attempt.
Reviving The Lima Group
On the international front, there is an ongoing initiative to revive the ill-fated Lima Group, which operated as the diplomatic arm of the United States against Venezuela for several years. The emerging leader of this effort appears to be Javier Milei, along with other Latin American presidents from the far-right, right, center, and the woke left. However, this coalition seems weak from the outset, especially since Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia are currently in a very different position regarding the Venezuelan situation.
The Internal Response To The New Self-Proclamation
Faced with Guaidó’s “interim government,” Maduro’s strategy was to let him stew in his own juice. This approach succeeded, as Guaidó is now a non-entity in the Venezuelan opposition spectrum. However, the cost was enormous. Through the interim presidency fantasy, Venezuela was stripped of its assets abroad, including major companies like CITGO and Monómeros, as well as bank accounts and gold deposits.
Guaidó remained in Venezuela from his self-proclamation in 2019 until 2023 when he traveled to Miami and settled in the city, where he lives like a prince. He was summoned only once by the Attorney General’s Office for questioning but did not attend. Security forces never detained him, despite constant accusations of serious crimes such as treason and corruption by government and Prosecutor’s Office spokespeople. It was evident that the strategy was to avoid arresting him to prevent turning him into a martyr.
This time, the government and the Attorney General’s Office seem to have a much shorter fuse. Following the publication of a statement signed by González Urrutia and his political leader, María Corina Machado, proclaiming González as president-elect, Attorney General Tarek William Saab announced the opening of an investigation against both. They are allegedly involved in crimes of usurpation of functions, spreading false information to cause unrest, incitement to disobey laws, incitement to insurrection, conspiracy, and criminal association.
Particularly serious, according to the Saab, is the call in the statement for military and police officers to disobey their superiors and to not recognize Maduro as the head of state.
It remains to be seen if the Attorney General’s Office will issue arrest warrants against González and Machado if the investigation confirms that they have committed these crimes.
Escalation Of Street Protests
Another area where the Venezuelan state has significantly improved its response capabilities, both in terms of force and timeliness, is in confronting street violence.
This expertise stems from several previous waves of unrest, during which police and military forces were involved in prolonged confrontations with violent protesters, such as the four-month-long “guarimbas” in 2017. These clashes resulted in over a hundred deaths.
Although those episodes saw fatalities among protesters, security personnel, and non-combatants, the opposition managed to consolidate them into a single narrative, accusing Maduro and his top officials of crimes against humanity.
On Monday, July 29, and part of Tuesday, July 30, there was a prevailing sense that the right-wing political leadership, with its fraud allegations, had once again achieved their long-cherished dream of “heating up” the streets. What began as traditional protests from people’s homes, with the clanging of pots and pans, quickly escalated into vandalism and criminal acts against social leaders of Chavismo, symbolic works and programs of the revolution, PSUV offices, public property, transportation systems, and some private establishments.
During the brief period of collective madness, Chavista leaders Mayaury Coromoto Silva Vielma in Turmero, Aragua state, and Isabel Cirila Gil in El Callao, Bolívar state, were murdered. Many other regional and local leaders received direct threats against them and their families. In Carora, Lara state, in addition to the PSUV house, opposition protesters destroyed a community radio station.
This time, however, the government managed to regain control within a few hours through intelligence and infiltration actions. Many of the thousands of detainees essentially incriminated themselves by posting their actions on social media.
In 2017, when the so-called “guarimbas” (pockets of disturbances with street closures, tire and garbage burning, and attacks on security forces) broke out, the impunity granted by the Public Ministry to the protesters was key. At that time, Attorney General Luisa Ortega Díaz sided with the insurrectional movement and therefore refused to prosecute cases where the responsibility of the protesters was evident (with testimonies, videos, photos, and voice messages), such as the burning and stabbing of Orlando Figuera in the Altamira neighborhood, an opposition stronghold.
By Wednesday, July 31, the situation had calmed. The government managed to control the outbreaks of violence with less damage than initially feared.
Several testimonies suggest that the bad memories of 2017 and 2014 not only helped the state improve its handling of the situation but also influenced the middle-class sectors, predominantly anti-Chavista, who recalled how the political leadership of those years used criminals from Caracas and other cities’ large neighborhoods to stoke the flames of rebellion. These individuals and their criminal organizations ended up taking over middle-class neighborhoods to commit thefts or extortions.
This time, the association with lawless individuals was very evident from the early hours, leading many opposition supporters to distance themselves from the violent protests.
The few hours of violence, however, were a very alarming symptom of the collective mental state of the country. It was a period in which base passions were unleashed, resulting in the murder of two PSUV social leaders and injuries to other leaders and militants, as well as members of the National Guard and the Bolivarian National Police.
Amid the turmoil, ordinary opponents showed their worst side by issuing death threats against their Chavista neighbors, besieging their homes and party headquarters, burning educational and health facilities, police stations, and vehicles.
The Institutional Field
Another demonstration of the political skill acquired through hard lessons was Maduro’s move: when no one expected it, he turned to the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) to request a review of what had occurred with the transmission of data from the voting machines to the National Electoral Council (CNE), which had been attacked by hackers, according to the denunciation by CNE president Elvis Amoroso on the day of the vote.
In fact, it should have been the opposition leaders that were questioning the electoral results announced by the CNE who should have gone to the TSJ. Legally, those who believe they have been victims of fraud must first contest the process administratively before the CNE, presenting the evidence they have; and then, if they do not receive the expected response, they should appeal to the highest national court, specifically the Electoral Chamber.
Maduro outmaneuvered his adversaries by approaching the TSJ not with an appeal, since he was declared the winner, but with a writ of amparo request for the institutional body to take charge of the electoral process and review the actions of the CNE and those who are alleging fraud.
Immediately, the TSJ summoned all presidential candidates to an initial meeting and then to separate meetings. Nine of the ten candidates that participated in the election attended. Only González Urrutia, the candidate who claims to have been a victim of fraud, was absent.
President Maduro and the CNE claimed to have submitted all the election tally sheets to the TSJ. Meanwhile, González’s team, with Machado as his spokesperson, published a portion of the records on a website but has not delivered them to the TSJ.
The Crisis Continues
The moderate opposition politician Enrique Ochoa Antich, in an analysis on his social media, has dared to make a prediction: “If I were a prophet, I would venture to predict this likely future: very soon the TSJ will issue a ruling validating the CNE bulletin; Maduro’s proclamation as the elected president will be confirmed; and Machado will end up in prison, in exile, or seeking asylum,” he says.
He adds, “The opposition will experience a new hangover, from which it will be hard to recover; the electoral route will be severely damaged. In short, more imprisonment, more exiles, more deaths, more sanctions, more poverty, more backwardness… and change will be even more difficult.”
Before the elections and with less drama, political scientist Carlos Raúl Hernández, in a pre-election interview, had warned that “the elections will not resolve the political crisis, but rather exacerbate it.” Given what has happened in just over a week, it is hard not to agree with him.