Above photo: Palestinian inspect buildings that sustained damage after an Israeli attack on the Nuseirat Refugee Camp in Gaza City, Gaza on December 13, 2024.(Omar Ashtawy/APA Images.
In recent days, Gaza ceasefire talks have seemed to gather unprecedented momentum.
But until Israel’s far-right government concedes it is ready to abandon the genocide any predictions of the horror finally ending should be taken with skepticism.
Talks for an end to the genocide in Gaza, which Western and Israeli media refer to as a “hostage deal,” have heated up to an unprecedented degree in recent days. The question is, how genuine an opportunity is this?
Over the course of 2024, we have repeatedly heard breathless hints of a deal being almost done, only to have the talks collapse as new demands come in from Israel. The United States government and media then go into overdrive to spin a narrative that Hamas was really the party that scuppered the deal. It has been a clear pattern.
Some things about this round are new, however. For one thing, it is not the Americans who are eagerly discussing the possibility of a deal, as has usually been the case. This time, Hamas has been the one saying that a deal is very close.
The reason for Hamas being public about this is straightforward: there simply isn’t much reason for them to keep fighting anymore. Gaza has been destroyed. Iran and Hezbollah have been beaten back, leaving only Ansarallah (also known as the Houthis) in Yemen standing militarily with Hamas. The distance between Yemen and Israel and Ansarallah’s limited resources make this support largely symbolic.
It has become clear that Israel is not going to be isolated in the West; so much so that it is Israel that just closed its embassy in Ireland, rather than the reverse. While Israel’s image has been permanently degraded by its genocide in Gaza, this has not led to the loss of trade or military partnerships and support. It hasn’t even cost Israel anything in the Arab world, where the normalized relations with Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco have not even been implicitly threatened.
For this reason, Hamas has not only been public about its hopes for an agreement with Israel, but it has conceded on some of the most important points in the hopes of raising public pressure on the Netanyahu government to accept the group’s concessions.
Desperate Measures
According to reports, Hamas has essentially conceded that Israel’s war on Gaza will not end, but a ceasefire for a specific period would be implemented, with a 60-day term currently being discussed.
Israel would pull out of Gaza’s cities, but remain in the Strip, crucially in the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, effectively bisecting Gaza. One key point of contention that apparently still remains is whether Israel will allow the return of northern Gaza’s residents.
In the first stage of the proposals, Hamas would free elderly and sick captives as well as women and children in exchange for some number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Israeli soldiers and, presumably, the most prominent of Palestinian prisoners would be released in a second phase, where Israel would also withdraw from Gaza almost entirely.
Perhaps the clearest sign that Hamas is determined to end the slaughter at almost any price is the fact that the second stage is very likely not going to happen, and Hamas knows it. Israeli journalist Amos Harel says that, “The mediators have reassured Hamas that the moment Israel enters a deal it will be difficult for the government to renege on Phase 2, both due to U.S. and domestic pressure from the hostage families.”
Rubbish. Those pressures have been there for months, and Netanyahu has not let them bother him in the slightest. Israel’s Defense Minister, Yisrael Katz, put their intention plainly: “After we defeat Hamas’s military and governmental power in Gaza, Israel will have security control over Gaza with full freedom of action.” No one seriously believes Israel will follow through on steps toward a permanent ceasefire in a second stage.
Israel envisions a prisoner exchange, a brief ceasefire, and then full control over Gaza. There is no serious proposal for running Gaza after the genocide, much less an agreed plan of action. The Israeli military will be in control. Israel is even considering a private firm to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid, under its military’s auspices, a program that would obviously be far less effective than the international bodies that have been doing that job.
Outside of Hamas continuing to insist on northern Gaza residents returning, there really isn’t much left they haven’t conceded on. What, then, is still holding up an agreement?
Netanyahu’s Dilemmas: Domestic Obstacles And Dealing With Two Presidents
One thing that hasn’t changed is that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has no reason to stop the genocide in Gaza. The protests over the captives in Israel have not affected him for the past year, and that hasn’t changed.
Israeli public opinion is heavily in favor of ending the genocide in exchange for the release of the captives, even among Netanyahu’s base, 56% of whom support such a deal while only 24% oppose it. But, if they are freed, that might change quickly. In any case, Netanyahu does not intend to face elections any time soon.
That point is key. Netanyahu wants to avoid elections as long as possible. But a ceasefire deal could bring one upon him if the far-right parties of Otzma Yehudit (Itamar Ben-Gvir’s party) and Religious Zionism (Bezalel Smotrich) bolt the governing coalition. Their departure would leave the government in a minority and bring up new elections.
This is the biggest reason for skepticism, despite some expressions of optimism from Israeli and American officials, and Hamas’ own repeated assertions that a deal is close.
But there are also practical obstacles, even beyond Netanyahu’s issues. Given the destruction and disarray in Gaza, can Hamas actually account for every captive, for example? Israel insists that neither Hamas nor the PA can have any role in running Gaza going forward, but even they have shown no interest in running the Strip beyond their military actions. Northern Gaza remains an impasse between the two parties.
All of these speak to real problems in securing even a temporary ceasefire.
The tone of the Joe Biden administration has been markedly subdued during these recent days of optimism for an end to the genocide. There is almost a tacit acknowledgment that their efforts have failed and that, even if they succeed now, it will be perceived as Donald Trump having turned the tide.
Trump, of course, will take credit for the talks suddenly shifting into high gear simply by threatening that “all hell will break out” if the captives are not returned. We know that Trump has communicated to Netanyahu his desire that the genocide end before he reaches office. And Trump made sure to send his envoy to the region, even though he doesn’t take office for another month.
In truth, though, neither Biden’s nor Trump’s role in the recent developments has been particularly impactful. With the shifting realities on the ground, it has been Qatar and Egypt who have facilitated the progress made in talks, but that progress was rooted in the shifting realities on the ground and the increasing desperation in Gaza as Israel continues its relentless slaughter while international aid continues to run up against Israeli obstruction. The American role has been to be a part of the negotiating team, but little more.
Trump’s threat, it should be noted, meant little to Hamas, despite his claims to the contrary. What, really, can the United States do to Gaza at this point that Israel is not already doing?
It was Netanyahu, not Hamas, who reacted to Trump. Netanyahu has moved to try to convince Trump that more destruction is still needed in Gaza and that there shouldn‘t be a deadline on Israeli actions. Whether Trump accepts that remains to be seen, but it seems reasonable to think that the massive gains Israel has made in the region militarily, especially the capitulation from Hezbollah in Lebanon, will satiate him for a while.
All of this suggests that the talk of a ceasefire almost within reach is overly optimistic. Of course, it can be attained if Netanyahu really wants it to be, but that’s been true for well over a year. Still, significant disincentives remain for Netanyahu.
It’s no longer a matter of outside pressure on Netanyahu. His brazen attacks on Syria—a country that, especially after Assad’s fall, in no way could be said to be threatening Israel—brought no consequences. That made it clear yet again that nothing Israel does in Gaza will provoke a response from the international community or the Arab world beyond a handful of empty words.
Joe Biden is limping toward the dustbin of history, with what may be seen in the future as the worst foreign policy record of any president in the U.S.’s shameful history. Donald Trump is coming in with an agenda for authoritarianism in the U.S. that he doesn’t want to be disrupted by foreign policy concerns. Netanyahu is already moving to appease Trump while hoping to maintain his war footing in Gaza.
Hamas has given just about everything it can give. All that’s really left for Israel to demand is its capitulation on Northern Gaza remaining off limits to Palestinians and perhaps a full release of all captives in Gaza in one exchange. Thus far, even the United States hasn’t endorsed those kinds of extreme demands. But that’s hardly outside the realm of possibility.
The only question that remains is when will it be in Netanyahu’s interest to end the genocide? That’s the one piece of the puzzle that hasn’t really shifted in recent weeks. It is possible that Hamas has conceded so much that even Netanyahu will not be able to justify continuing the slaughter for much longer. But until a deal is actually completed or the far-right parties in Netanyahu’s government concede that they have done enough damage to the people and structure of the Gaza Strip, all the talks about this horror finally ending should be taken with enormous skepticism.